

## COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

Code of course: <b>BA-ERA-IPH-S-1, MA-ERA-IPH-S-1</b>
Title of course: <b>Philosophy of Mind</b>
Lecturer: <b>Gergely Ambrus</b>
<p><b>Aim of the course:</b>  The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in contemporary philosophy of mind, i. e. different views on the mind-body relation, the nature of consciousness and intentionality.</p> <p><b>Level of course: introductory/intermediate</b></p> <p><b>I. THE MIND-BODY RELATION</b></p> <p><b>1. Cartesian Dualism</b>  Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM.</p> <p><b>2. Logical Behaviorism</b>  Ryle, G. <i>The Concept of Mind</i>. Chap. 1. Descartes' Myth. In CPM.  Carnap, R. Psychology in Physical Language. In A. J. Ayer (ed.) <i>Logical Positivism</i>. New York, Free Press, 1959. 165–198.*</p> <p><b>3-4. Materialism</b></p> <p><b>3. Reductionist Materialism: Mind-Brain Identity Theory</b>  Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. <i>Philosophical Review</i> 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM.  Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM.  Lewis, D. An Argument for the Identity Theory. <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> 63 (1966). 17–25.</p> <p><b>4. Eliminative Materialism</b>  Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM.  Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> 78 (1981). 67–90.</p> <p><b>5-6. Functionalism</b></p> <p><b>5. The Functionalist Conception of the Mind</b>  Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM.  Block, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In CPM.</p> <p><b>6. The Computationalist Theory of Mind</b>  <i>Classical Cognitivism</i>  Haugland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i>, 1981(2). 215-226.  <i>Criticism of Classical Cognitivism</i>  Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. In CPM.</p> <p><b>7. Anomalous Monism</b>  Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM.</p> <p><b>II. CONSCIOUSNESS</b></p> <p><b>8. The Problem of Consciousness</b>  Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM.  Block, N. Concepts of Consciousness. In CPM.</p> <p><b>9. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: The Knowledge Argument</b>  Jackson, F. What Mary Didn't Know. <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> 5 (1986). 291-295.  Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) <i>Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays</i>. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136.  Van Gulick, R. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind. Are We All Just Armadillos (Part I)? In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) <i>Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays</i>. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 137-154.  McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM.</p>

#### **10. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: Modal Arguments**

Kripke, S.: *Naming and Necessity* (excerpts). In CPM.

Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140.

### **III. INTENTIONALITY**

#### **10. The Nature of Intentionality**

Brentano, F. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (excerpts). In CPM.

Chisholm, R.M. "Intentional Inexistence" (excerpts). In CPM.\*

#### **11-12. Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality**

Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127.

Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM.

#### **13. Interpretationism: The Intentional Stance**

Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM.

Dennett, D.C. Real Patterns. *The Journal of Philosophy*. 88 (1991). 27-51.\*

#### **14. Intentionality and Phenomenology**

Horgan, T. – Tienson, J. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In CPM.

Abbreviation

CPM = Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

#### **Course requirements, evaluation:**

1) Active participation in the course 2) presentation 3) course paper.

#### **Readings:**

Compulsory reading: listed above, except the texts marked by \*.

Suggested further readings: the texts marked by \*  
and

Block, N. – Flanagan, O. J. – Güzeldere, G. (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1997.

Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136.

Stich, S. – Warfield, T. (eds.) *Mental Representation*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1994.

Code of course: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-5, MA-ERA-IPH-S-5**

Title of course: **Introduction to Epistemology**

Lecturer: **Jenő Pöntör**

#### **General aim of the course:**

The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in epistemology.

Content of the course:

Topics included in the course are:

1. What is knowledge?
2. Sources of human knowledge.
3. Skepticism.
4. Theories of justification
5. Modern and contemporary anti-skeptical strategies.
6. Religious epistemology.

#### **Grading criteria, specific requirements:**

There are no specific requirements for this course. Students are expected to attend all meetings and must write an 5-8 page essay (in English or Hungarian) related to one of the discussed topics, chosen by the student.

**Required reading:**

1. Descartes, René, 1641, *Meditations* I, II, III.
2. Stroud, Barry, 1984, "The Problem of the External World". Originally published as ch. 1 in Barry Stroud: *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
3. Ryle, Gilbert, 1964, *Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 94–95 (Counterfeit Coinage Argument).
4. Putnam, Hilary, 1981, "Brains in a Vat", in Hilary Putnam: *Reason, Truth, and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1. 1–21.
5. Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", *Analysis*, 23 (6): 121–123.
6. Goldman, Alvin, 1967, "A Causal Theory of Knowing",  
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/078a/d2b9117693dbab0739ab2001a25b10a5ef35.pdf>
7. Nozick, Robert, 1981, "Knowledge and Skepticism", in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, (ed.): *Epistemology: An Anthology*, Blackwell, 2000
8. Van Cleve, James, 1979, "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle", in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, (ed.): *Epistemology: An Anthology*, Blackwell, 2000.
9. Bonjour, Laurence, 1978, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?", in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, (ed.): *Epistemology: An Anthology*, Blackwell, 2000.
10. Plantinga, Alvin, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?," *Noûs* 15 (1981): 41–51.

**Suggested further reading:**

1. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/>
2. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/>
3. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemology/>
4. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/>
5. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/>
6. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/>
7. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/>

Code of course: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-6, MA-ERA-IPH-S-6**Title of course: **Introduction to Philosophy**Lecturer: **Judit Szalai****General aim of the course:**

The course addresses some main issues in philosophy, one of which will be discussed during each session. Grading will be based on in-class activity and a short presentation (a short version of which should also be submitted at the end of the semester).

**Required readings:**

1. Introduction; famine, affluence, and morality  
P. Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality  
[http://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/teaching/mm/articles/Singer\\_1972Famine.pdf](http://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/teaching/mm/articles/Singer_1972Famine.pdf)
2. Would we get hooked up to the experience machine?  
R. Nozick: Anarchy, State, and Utopia (excerpt)
3. Facebook ethics  
W. P. Smith, D. L. Kidder: You've Been Tagged!...
4. The trolley problem: who is the driver supposed to run over?  
J. Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem  
<http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/courses/hon182/thomsontrolley.pdf>
5. Moral luck: could Gaughin's leaving his family be justified?  
B. Williams: Moral Luck  
[https://bibliotecamathom.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/williams\\_-\\_moralLuck.pdf](https://bibliotecamathom.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/williams_-_moralLuck.pdf)
6. Moral character  
J. Doris: *Lack of Character* (excerpt)
7. Euthanasia, for and against

<p>J. Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia  <a href="https://sites.ualberta.ca/~bleier/Rachels_Euthanasia.pdf">https://sites.ualberta.ca/~bleier/Rachels_Euthanasia.pdf</a></p> <p>8. Lying and bullshit  H. Frankfurt: On Bullshit  <a href="https://www5.csudh.edu/ccauthen/576f12/frankfurt_harry_-_on_bullshit.pdf">https://www5.csudh.edu/ccauthen/576f12/frankfurt_harry_-_on_bullshit.pdf</a></p> <p>9. Work  A. Gheaus: The Goods of Work (Other Than Money)</p> <p>10. Emotion  W. James: What is an Emotion?  <a href="https://emotion.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1353/2020/11/James_1884_What_is_an_Emotion.pdf">https://emotion.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1353/2020/11/James_1884_What_is_an_Emotion.pdf</a></p> <p>11. Who is a person?  H. Frankfurt: Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person  <a href="http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~schopra/Persons/Frankfurt.pdf">http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~schopra/Persons/Frankfurt.pdf</a></p>
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Code of course: <b>BA-ERA-IPH-S-17, MA-ERA-IPH-S-18</b>
Title of course: <b>Wittgenstein's Inheritors</b>
Lecturer: <b>Jamie Elliott</b>
<p><b>General aim of the course:</b>  This course addresses topics in the philosophy of action and offers an introduction to various debates and historical positions of the field.</p> <p><b>Content of the course:</b> The course considers various topics in the philosophy of action. We will investigate works by Aristotle, Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Sigmund Freud, Elizabeth Anscombe, John McDowell, and Thomas Nagel.</p> <p>Session One: The practical syllogism in the work of Aristotle  Session Two: Is there a single end to our actions?  Session Three: The notion of willing in early modern philosophy  Session Four: The free will debate in early modern philosophy  Session Five: Is self-governance possible?  Session Six: What makes an action intentional?  Session Seven: Are there unconscious intentions?  Session Eight: Knowledge of our actions  Session Nine: Trying as an action  Session Ten: Ethics and intentional action  Session Eleven: Intentionality and action  Session Twelve: Philosophy of action and the notion of the good person</p>

Code of course: <b>BA-ERA-IPH-S-19, MA-ERA-IPH-S-19</b>
Title of course: <b>Topics in the Philosophy of Action</b>
Lecturer: <b>Jamie Elliott</b>
<p><b>General aim of the course:</b>  This course addresses topics in the philosophy of action and offers an introduction to various debates and historical positions of the field.</p> <p><b>Content of the course:</b> The course begins by offering an introduction to Wittgenstein's later philosophical project and how he sought to realise it through developing a philosophy of language. We will then consider various ways in which Wittgenstein's project has been interpreted by or inspired later thinkers including Elizabeth Anscombe and Hilary Putnam.</p> <p>Session One: Approaching Wittgenstein's later work.  Session Two: Wittgenstein's philosophical vision and one way to achieve it.  Session Three: Accounts of meaning which Wittgenstein critiques  Session Four: The account of meaning in the <i>Philosophical Investigations</i> (1958)</p>

<p>Session Five: Was Wittgenstein a common-sense philosopher?</p> <p>Session Six: Is this a dream?</p> <p>Session Seven: Introspection and the metaphysics of mind</p> <p>Session Eight: What am I?</p> <p>Session Nine: Am I a brain in a vat?</p> <p>Session Ten: Goodness</p> <p>Session Eleven: Madness</p> <p>Session Twelve: Hinge epistemology</p> <p><b>Grading criteria, specific requirements:</b></p> <p>Grades will be based on an essay (1500-3000 words). Although essay questions will be provided, participants are strongly encouraged to develop their own paper/project in response to material from the course.</p>
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Code of course: <b>BA-ERA-IPH-S-20, MA-ERA-IPH-S-20</b>
Title of course: <b>Knowledge and Power</b>
Lecturer: <b>Attila Mráz</b>
<p><b>General aim of the course:</b></p> <p>The course offers a survey of epistemological issues that are pressing for social and political philosophers—also known as ‘political epistemology’—on the one hand, and it surveys issues in political philosophy that should be pressing for epistemologists and philosophers of science, on the other. In short, we are interested in what is the meaning and relevance of knowledge, justified belief, disagreement and expertise for the justified exercise of political power in liberal democracies—and we will examine how social and political inequalities and power imbalances shape our collective practices of knowledge formation, as well as asking how they should not. These theoretical explorations have wide-ranging applied implications, helping us reflect on political polarization, politically shaped scientific agendas, academic freedom, technocratic politics, sexist or racist scientific and political agendas, and conspiracy theories.</p> <p><b>Content of the course:</b></p> <p>Topics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• social epistemology, problems of testimonial evidence in politics</li> <li>• the epistemology of disagreement, and the political philosophy of reasonable vs. unreasonable disagreement</li> <li>• the role of science and expertise in democracy</li> <li>• the role of democracy in scientific and academic inquiry</li> <li>• sexism and racism in knowledge-generation and dissemination, epistemic injustices and epistemic discrimination</li> <li>• conspiracy theories</li> </ul> <p><b>Grading criteria, specific requirements:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attendance and active participation (which may include asking questions about unclear points in the reading, reacting to others’ arguments, or voicing your own arguments).</li> <li>• All students taking the class for credit must submit a term paper of ca. 1500 words on a topic approved by the instructor.</li> </ul> <p><b>Required reading:</b></p> <p>(Some of the topics will cover more than more class.)</p> <p>1. <i>Social Sources of Knowledge: Testimonial Evidence (in Politics)</i></p> <p>1a. <i>Social and Political Epistemology, Testimony</i></p> <p>Goldman, Alvin. (1987). “Foundations of Social Epistemics”, <i>Synthese</i>, 73(1): 109–144. doi:10.1007/BF00485444</p> <p>1b. <i>Testimony and Autonomy</i></p>

- Elizabeth Fricker. (2006). Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy. In: Jennifer Lackley and Ernest Sosa (eds.), *The Epistemology of Testimony* (pp. 225–250). Oxford: Clarendon.
- 1c. *Political Testimony and Democracy*
- Han van Wietmarschen. (2019). “Political Testimony”, *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, 18 (1):23–45.
- Brinkmann, Matthias. (2020). In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference. *Episteme*, 1-22. doi:10.1017/epi.2020.26
2. *Peer Disagreement and Epistemic Justification*
- Christensen, David, 2009, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”, *Philosophy Compass*, 4(5): 756–767. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x
- Kelly, Thomas. (2013). Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays*. 31-53. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
3. *Reasonable Disagreement in Contemporary Liberal Political Philosophy*
- Neufeld, Blain. (2013). Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education. *Philosophy Compass* 7(9): 781–797. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12064
- Rawls, John. (1993). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia UP. II. § 2. (“The Burdens of Judgment”): pp. 54-58. For MA students, also pp. 48–66, 144–158, 103–121, 197–211.
- Christiano, Thomas. (2008). *The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and Its Limits*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197–200: “Egalitarian Public Deliberation”.
4. *The Possibility of Politics amidst Deep Disagreement*
- Ebels-Duggan, Kyla (2010). The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 60(238) 50-71.
- Talisse, Robert. (2021). The Paradox of Unity. *Arx*, January 26, 2021. <https://arcdigital.media/the-paradox-of-unity-feb6b093a827>
5. *Expertise, Knowledge and Democratic Decision-Making*
- Anderson, Elizabeth. (2006). “The Epistemology of Democracy”, *Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology*, 3(1): 8–22. doi:10.1353/epi.0.0000
- Peter, Fabienne. (2016). The Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy. In: Miranda Fricker, Michael Brady (eds.), *The Epistemic Life of Groups*. pp. 133 – 149. Oxford, OUP.
- Goldman, Alvin. (2001). “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63(1): 85–110. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x
6. *Democratizing Scientific Inquiry*
- Philip Kitcher. (2001). *Science, Truth and Democracy*. Oxford UP. Ch. 10: “Well-Ordered Science”. pp. 117-136.
- David B. Resnik. (2008). Scientific Autonomy and Public Oversight. *Episteme* 5(2): 220–238. doi:10.3366/E1742360008000336
7. *Academic freedom*
- Robert Berdahl (2010). Thoughts About Academic Freedom, Autonomy and Accountability. [http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/Berdahl\\_2010Thoughts\\_Abou\\_Academic\\_Freedom\\_Autonomy\\_and\\_Accountability.pdf](http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/Berdahl_2010Thoughts_Abou_Academic_Freedom_Autonomy_and_Accountability.pdf)
- Magna Charta Universitatum* (1988). <http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/the-magna-charta/english>
- Background information: <http://www.magna-charta.org/magna-charta-universitatum/read-the-magna-charta/the-magna-charta>
8. *Conspiracy Theories and Liberal Democratic Responses*
- Cassam, Quassim (2019). Why Conspiracy Theories Are Deeply Dangerous. *The New Statesman*, 7 October 2019. <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/north-america/2019/10/why-conspiracy-theories-are-deeply-dangerous>
- Cibik, Matej & Pavol Hardos (2020). Conspiracy theories and reasonable pluralism. 1-21. *European Journal of Political Theory*. Online First, published 1 April 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885119899232>.
9. *Epistemic Injustice*

Miranda Fricker (2007). *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press. Ch. 1: "Testimonial Injustice", pp. 9–29; Ch. 3: "Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony", pp. 86–109.

Miranda Fricker (2007). *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press. Ch. 7: "Hermeneutical Injustice", pp. 147–175.

Elizabeth Anderson (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. *Social Epistemology* 26(2): 163–173.

10. *Epistemic Discrimination*

Katherine Puddifoot. (2018). Epistemic Discrimination. In: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination*. London & New York: Routledge. pp. 54–67.

Code of course: <b>BA-ERA-IPH-L-3, MA-ERA-IPH-L-3</b>
Title of course: <b>The Metaphysics of Social Systems</b>
Lecturer: <b>Dániel Kodaj</b>
<p><b>Aim of the course:</b> An overview of recent work in social ontology concerning emergent social structures.</p> <p><b>Course homepage:</b> <a href="https://dkodaj.net/elte">https://dkodaj.net/elte</a></p> <p><b>Content of the course:</b> This is a course on social ontology, a rapidly developing field of inquiry that uses the tools of analytic metaphysics to study social phenomena. Our topic will be the idea of social systems. According to a venerable tradition in philosophy and sociology, associated with Hegel, Marx, and Luhmann (among others), societies are complex unities like organisms or sophisticated machines. They are not, in other words, mere aggregates of individuals whose small-scale interactions and individual decisions constitute, by way of simple addition, social reality. In contrast to such individualistic approaches, systems theorists emphasize irreducible large-scale structures as the key to the existence and persistence of societies. The course looks at a series of recent papers that are relevant for a systems approach. No previous knowledge of metaphysics, sociology, or social ontology is assumed.</p> <p><b>Assessment</b> Presentation from one of the readings + term paper (1200 words)</p> <p><b>Schedule and readings:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Introduction</li> <li>2 Organisations as computing systems David Strohmaier: Organisations as computing systems</li> <li>3 Game-theoretic models of large-scale social structures I Cyril Hédoin: The beliefs-rules-equilibrium account of institutions</li> <li>4 Game-theoretic models of large-scale social structures II Michael Vlerick: The evolution of social contracts</li> <li>5 Group cognition Kirk Ludwig: Is distributed cognition group level cognition?</li> <li>6 The efficacy of collective intentionality Dave Elder-Vass: Collective intentionality and causal powers</li> <li>7 The identity of institutions Joshua Rust: Institutional identity</li> <li>8 Groups and their parts I David Strohmaier: Group membership and parthood</li> <li>9 Groups and their parts II Dave Elder-Vass: Material Parts in Social Structures</li> <li>10 Groups as persons Onni Hirvonen: Groups as persons? A suggestion for a Hegelian turn</li> </ol>



11 Collective intentionality and social power

Michael J. Thompson: Collective intentionality, social domination, and reification

12 Critical theory and processual social ontology

Emmanuel Renault: Critical theory and processual social ontology

13 Are societies prior to individuals?

Lynne Rudder Baker: Human persons as social entities

**Recommended literature:**

Brian Epstein (2018): Social ontology. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/>  
al epistemology’—on the one hand, and it surveys issues in political philosophy that should be pressing for epistemologists and philosophers of science, on the other. In short, we are interested in what is the meaning and relevance of knowledge, justified belief, disagreement and expertise for the justified exercise of political power in liberal democracies—and we will examine how social and political inequalities and power imbalances shape our collective practices of knowledge formation, as well as asking how they should not. These theoretical explorations have wide-ranging applied implications, helping us reflect on political polarization, politically shaped scientific agendas, academic freedom, technocratic politics, sexist or racist scientific and political agendas, and conspiracy theories.

**Content of the course:**

Topics:

- social epistemology, problems of testimonial evidence in politics
- the epistemology of disagreement, and the political philosophy of reasonable vs. unreasonable disagreement
- the role of science and expertise in democracy
- the role of democracy in scientific and academic inquiry
- sexism and racism in knowledge-generation and dissemination, epistemic injustices and epistemic discrimination
- conspiracy theories

**Grading criteria, specific requirements:**

- Attendance and active participation (which may include asking questions about unclear points in the reading, reacting to others’ arguments, or voicing your own arguments).
- All students taking the class for credit must submit a term paper of ca. 1500 words on a topic approved by the instructor.

**Required reading:**

(Some of the topics will cover more than more class.)

1. *Social Sources of Knowledge: Testimonial Evidence (in Politics)*

1a. *Social and Political Epistemology, Testimony*

Goldman, Alvin. (1987). “Foundations of Social Epistemics”, *Synthese*, 73(1): 109–144. doi:10.1007/BF00485444

1b. *Testimony and Autonomy*

Elizabeth Fricker. (2006). Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy. In: Jennifer Lackley and Ernest Sosa (eds.), *The Epistemology of Testimony* (pp. 225–250). Oxford: Clarendon.

1c. *Political Testimony and Democracy*

Han van Wietmarschen. (2019). “Political Testimony”, *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, 18 (1):23–45.

Brinkmann, Matthias. (2020). In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference. *Episteme*, 1-22. doi:10.1017/epi.2020.26

2. *Peer Disagreement and Epistemic Justification*

Christensen, David, 2009, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”, *Philosophy Compass*, 4(5): 756–767. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x

Kelly, Thomas. (2013). Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays*. 31-53. Oxford, Oxford University Press.



3. *Reasonable Disagreement in Contemporary Liberal Political Philosophy*

Neufeld, Blain. (2013). Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education. *Philosophy Compass* 7(9): 781–797. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12064

Rawls, John. (1993). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia UP. II. § 2. ("The Burdens of Judgment"): pp. 54–58. For MA students, also pp. 48–66, 144–158, 103–121, 197–211.

Christiano, Thomas. (2008). *The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and Its Limits*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197–200: "Egalitarian Public Deliberation".

4. *The Possibility of Politics amidst Deep Disagreement*

Ebels-Duggan, Kyla (2010). The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 60(238) 50–71.

Talisse, Robert. (2021). The Paradox of Unity. *Arx*, January 26, 2021. <https://arcdigital.media/the-paradox-of-unity-feb6b093a827>

5. *Expertise, Knowledge and Democratic Decision-Making*

Anderson, Elizabeth. (2006). "The Epistemology of Democracy", *Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology*, 3(1): 8–22. doi:10.1353/epi.0.0000

Peter, Fabienne. (2016). The Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy. In: Miranda Fricker, Michael Brady (eds.), *The Epistemic Life of Groups*. pp. 133 – 149. Oxford, OUP.

Goldman, Alvin. (2001). "Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63(1): 85–110. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x

6. *Democratizing Scientific Inquiry*

Philip Kitcher. (2001). *Science, Truth and Democracy*. Oxford UP. Ch. 10: "Well-Ordered Science". pp. 117–136.

David B. Resnik. (2008). Scientific Autonomy and Public Oversight. *Episteme* 5(2): 220–238. doi:10.3366/E1742360008000336

7. *Academic freedom*

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