



COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

Code of course: BA-ERA-IPH-S-1, MA-ERA-IPH-S-1
Title of course: Philosophy of Mind
Lecturer: Gergely Ambrus
Aim of the course: The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in contemporary philosophy of mind, i. e. different views on the mind-body relation, the nature of consciousness and intentionality.
Level of course: introductory/intermediate
I. THE MIND-BODY RELATION
1. Cartesian Dualism Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM.
2. Logical Behaviorism Ryle, G. <i>The Concept of Mind</i> . Chap. 1. Descartes' Myth. In CPM. Carnap, R. Psychology in Physical Language. In A. J. Ayer (ed.) <i>Logical Positivism</i> . New York, Free Press, 1959. 165–198.*
3-4. Materialism
3. Reductionist Materialism: Mind-Brain Identity Theory Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. <i>Philosophical Review</i> 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM. Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM. Lewis, D. An Argument for the Identity Theory. <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> 63 (1966). 17–25.
4. Eliminative Materialism Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM. Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> 78 (1981). 67–90.
5-6. Functionalism
5. The Functionalist Conception of the Mind Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM. Block, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In CPM.
6. The Computationalist Theory of Mind <i>Classical Cognitivism</i> Haugland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 1981(2). 215-226. <i>Criticism of Classical Cognitivism</i> Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. In CPM.
7. Anomalous Monism Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM.
II. CONSCIOUSNESS
8. The Problem of Consciousness Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM. Block, N. Concepts of Consciousness. In CPM.
9. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: The Knowledge Argument Jackson, F. What Mary Didn't Know. <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> 5 (1986). 291-295. Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) <i>Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays</i> . Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136. Van Gulick, R. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind. Are We All Just Armadillos (Part I)? In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) <i>Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays</i> . Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 137-154.

McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM.

10. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: Modal Arguments

Kripke, S.: *Naming and Necessity* (excerpts). In CPM.

Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140.

III. INTENTIONALITY

10. The Nature of Intentionality

Brentano, F. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (excerpts). In CPM.

Chisholm, R.M. "Intentional Inexistence" (excerpts). In CPM.*

11-12. Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality

Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127.

Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM.

13. Interpretationism: The Intentional Stance

Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM.

Dennett, D.C. Real Patterns. *The Journal of Philosophy*. 88 (1991). 27-51.*

14. Intentionality and Phenomenology

Horgan, T. – Tienson, J. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In CPM.

Abbreviation

CPM = Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Course requirements, evaluation:

1) Active participation in the course 2) presentation 3) course paper.

Readings:

Compulsory reading: listed above, except the texts marked by *.

Suggested further readings: the texts marked by *

and

Block, N. – Flanagan, O. J. – Güzeldere, G. (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1997.

Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136.

Stich, S. – Warfield, T. (eds.) *Mental Representation*. Oxford, Backwell, 1994.

Code of course: BA-ERA-IPH-S-4, MA-ERA-IPH-S-4
Title of course: The Reconstruction of the Postmodernism
Lecturer: Endre Kiss
General aim of the course: The interpretation of Postmodernism as a historical period. An analytical exploration of postmodernist structures of cognition.
Content of the course: Comprehensive exploration of the most important tendencies of postmodernist thinking. Reconstruction of the most important antecedent of this philosophy, the structuralist movement. The specific questions of the legitimacy of Postmodernism. Postmodernist semantics. The category of difference. The potential postmodernist synthesis (Ricoeur). The uprising of deconstructivism. Leading representatives of Postmodernism (Foucault, Derrida, Negri). Postmodern Everyday Consciousness. The empirical and practical achievements of Postmodernism.
Grading criteria, specific requirements: Paper (written essay) analyzing a post-modernist text or a postmodernist phenomenon. In individual project is also possible.

<p>Required reading: Foucault Michel, Die Ordnung des Diskurses. 1970. (to read also in English or French) Lyotard, Jean-Francois, Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien, 1986. (to read also in English or French)</p> <p>Suggested further reading: Hardt-Negri, Empire. 2000. A posztmodern gondolkodás rekonstrukciójának alapvonásai. in: Magyar Filozófiai Szemle, 1992/3-4. 461-485. Kiss Endre, Globalizáció és/vagy posztmodern, 2003. Studies of Baudrillard and Virilio. Semiologie und Grammatologie in Postmoderne und Dekonstruktion, Stuttgart, 1990.</p>

Code of course: BA-ERA-IPH-S-5, MA-ERA-IPH-S-5
Title of course: Introduction to Epistemology
Lecturer: Jenő Pöntör
<p>General aim of the course: The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in epistemology. Content of the course: Topics included in the course are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is knowledge? 2. Sources of human knowledge. 3. Skepticism. 4. Theories of justification 5. Modern and contemporary anti-skeptical strategies. 6. Religious epistemology. <p>Grading criteria, specific requirements: There are no specific requirements for this course. Students are expected to attend all meetings and must write an 5-8 page essay (in English or Hungarian) related to one of the discussed topics, chosen by the student.</p> <p>Required reading:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Descartes, René, 1641, <i>Meditations</i> I, II, III. 2. Stroud, Barry, 1984, “The Problem of the External World”. Originally published as ch. 1 in Barry Stroud: <i>The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 3. Ryle, Gilbert, 1964, <i>Dilemmas</i>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 94–95 (Counterfeit Coinage Argument). 4. Putnam, Hilary, 1981, “Brains in a Vat”, in Hilary Putnam: <i>Reason, Truth, and History</i>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1. 1–21. 5. Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, <i>Analysis</i>, 23 (6): 121–123. 6. Goldman, Alvin, 1967, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/078a/d2b9117693dbab0739ab2001a25b10a5ef35.pdf 7. Nozick, Robert, 1981, “Knowledge and Skepticism”, in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, (ed.): <i>Epistemology: An Anthology</i>, Blackwell, 2000 8. Van Cleve, James, 1979, “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle”, in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, (ed.): <i>Epistemology: An Anthology</i>, Blackwell, 2000. 9. Bonjour, Laurence, 1978, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”, in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, (ed.): <i>Epistemology: An Anthology</i>, Blackwell, 2000. 10. Plantinga, Alvin, “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?,” <i>Noûs</i> 15 (1981): 41–51. <p>Suggested further reading:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ 2. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ 3. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemology/ 4. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ 5. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/

6. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/>
 7. Stanford Encyclopaedia entry: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/>

Course code: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-6, MA-ERA-IPH-S-6**

Title of course: **Introduction to Philosophy**

Instructor: **Judit Szalai**

General aim of the course:

The course addresses some topical issues in contemporary philosophy. The sessions will be pre-recorded, with a (non-obligatory) consultation session on the 5th and 12th weeks.

Required readings:

1. Introduction;
Vincent C. Müller: Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
<https://philpapers.org/archive/MLLEOA-5.pdf>
2. Thomas Nagel: What is it like to be a bat?
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/iatl/study/ugmodules/humananimalstudies/lectures/32/nagel_bat.pdf
3. Ronald de Sousa: Love and Reasons
<http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~sousa/LOVE%20REASON%20GOLDIE.pdf>
4. Robert Nozick: *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (excerpt)
<http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil3160/Nozick1.pdf>
5. Christine James: Irrationality in Philosophy and Psychology: the moral implications of self-defeating behavior
<https://philarchive.org/rec/JAMIIP>
6. Mid-term test
7. Jacqueline Anne Sullivan: Models of Mental Illness
<https://philpapers.org/rec/SULMMO-2>
8. Alfred Mele and Joshua Shepherd: Situationism and Agency
<file:///C:/Users/Hp/Downloads/SSRN-id2463220.pdf>
9. Bernard Williams: Moral Luck
https://bibliotecamathom.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/williams_-_moral_luck.pdf
10. Harry Frankfurt: On Bullshit
https://www5.csudh.edu/ccauthen/576f12/frankfurt_harry_-_on_bullshit.pdf
11. Anca Gheaus: The Goods of Work (Other Than Money)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299443783_The_Goods_of_Work_Other_Than_Money
12. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/teaching/mm/articles/Singer_1972Famine.pdf
13. End-of-term test

Grading criteria :

Grades are based on two (mid-term and end-of-term) tests about the mandatory readings. The lectures will help process the texts, provide context and elaborate on the topic of the week. Extra material covered by the lectures will not be required for the tests.

Code of course: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-7, MA-ERA-IPH-S-7**

Title of course: **Empirically Informed Ethics**

Lecturer: **Anna Réz**

General aim of the course:

Ethical theories always rely on heavy assumptions about human psychology, motivation and behaviour. In recent decades, however, empirical sciences (most notably psychology, social psychology and neurology), have often provided data which seemingly contradicted these assumptions. In what ways can empirical researches interact with moral theories? The course provides an overview of the interdisciplinary approach of empirically informed science through investigating three topics: moral responsibility, moral judgments and moral character. This is an advanced seminar where previous knowledge in philosophy or psychology is highly recommended.

Content of the course:

Topics and readings:**I. Free will and moral responsibility**

Thomas Pink: *Free Will. A Very Short Introduction*, Chapter 1. Oxford University Press, USA, 2004.

Libet, Benjamin (2011) Do We Have Free Will? In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel (eds.): *Conscious Will and Responsibility*, pp. 1–11. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Roskies, Adina L. (2011) Why Libet's Studies Don't Pose a Threat to Free Will. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel (eds.): *Conscious Will and Responsibility*, pp. 11–23. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Knobe, J. & Doris, J. M. (2010) Responsibility. In John M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds.): *The Moral Psychology Handbook*, pp. 321–354. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

II. Moral judgments

Slote, M. (2006) Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology. In David Copp (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, pp. 219–239. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Haidt, J. (2001) The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. *Psychological Review* 108, pp. 814–834.

Jones, Karen (2006) Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz. *Philosophical Explorations* 9, pp. 45–53.

Kennett, Jeanette & Cordelia Fine (2009) Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand up? The Implications of Social Intuitionist Models of Cognition for Meta-Ethics and Moral Psychology. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 77–96.

III. Character and situationism

Annas, Julia (2006) Virtue Ethics. In David Copp (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, pp. 515–537. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Doris, J. M. (2002) *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior* (excerpts). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Nelkin, D. K. (2005) Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 29, pp. 181–206.

Grading criteria, specific requirements:

Requirements:

- active class participation – 20 %
- response papers (min. 5) – 40 %
- end-of-term exam – 40 %

Required reading:

See above.

Suggested further reading:

Doris, John M. & the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds.). (2014) *The Moral Psychology Handbook*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Christen, M., van Schaik, C., Fischer, J., Huppenbauer, M., Tanner, C. (eds.). (2014) *Empirically Informed Ethics: Morality between Facts and Norms*. Springer International Publishing: Switzerland.

Code of course: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-14, MA-ERA-IPH-S-14**

Title of course: **Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility**

Lecturer: **Zhiwei Gu**

General aim of the course:

By the end of the course, students who have completed the required work will achieve a better understanding of the problem of free will, the main positions in the contemporary debate, and the importance of free will.

Content of the course:

We conceive our ourselves as free agents: we think freely and act freely. But we also believe that we are part of the physical world which governed by laws of nature. Are these two conceptions compatible? If it

is not compatible, can we still be free agents and have moral responsibility? This course will study a number of proposed answers to these questions drawn from historical and contemporary sources.

Required reading:

(P)= Derk Pereboom (ed), Free Will, Hackett Readings in Philosophy.

(K)= Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will

Week 1, (P) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, selections; The Stoics, selections

Week 2, (P) Thomas Reid, from Essays on the Active Powers of Man

Week 3, A.J.Ayer, Freedom and Necessity; Roderick Chisholm, Human Freedom and the Self; in Gary Watson (ed), Free Will. OUP 2003

Week 4, Van Inwagen, “An Argument for Incompatibilism”, in Gary Watson (ed), Free Will. OUP 2003.

Week 5, Lewis, “Are we Free to Break the Laws?”, in Gary Watson (ed), Free Will. OUP 2003.

Week 6, (K) Chapter 4, “Libertarianism, Indeterminism and Chance”

Week 7, (K) Chapter 7, “Is Free Will Possible? Hard Determinists and Other Skeptics

Week 8, (P) Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”

Week 9, Michael Slote, “Selective Necessity and the Free Will Problem

Week 10, Martin Fischer& Mark Ravizza, “Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility”, Chapter 3.

Week 11, P. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”

Week 12, Wallace, “Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments”

Week 13, (P) Galen Strawson, “The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility”

Week 14, Barry Loewer, “Freedom From Physics: Quantum mechanics and Free Will”

Grading criteria, specific requirements:

All students must attend the classes and are required to produce regular brief reflections on their reading.

All students taking the class for credit must submit a 500 word short paper on a topic discussed before Week 7 and a 2000 word final paper on a topic agreed in advance with the instructor. The grade for the class will be the grade earned for the short paper and the final paper (25% and 60%, respectively). Regular brief reflections on readings count 15%, though in exceptional cases extra credit may be awarded for participation throughout the term.

Suggested further reading:

Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.